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This paper investigates the pricing of full deposit insurance in Germany in the context of its 
political promise by the German government. We implement the characteristics of the mutual 
guarantee framework of German banks and the specifics of the German deposit insurance 
system into a Monte Carlo model. The analysis suggests that banks have an incentive to 
increase their riskiness if they do not have to bear the fair value of the insurance costs of their 
deposits. On the other hand, the government should incentivise banks to reduce their size and 
become more specialized to achieve better diversification in the German banking landscape.  
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1.  Introduction 
The  financial  crisis  of  2008-2010  has  shown  an  unprecedented  surge  in  governmental 
interventions in the banking sector around the world.  The size and interconnectedness of 
banks  forced  governments  to  devise  rescue  packages  and  measures  to  avoid  a  systemic 
meltdown of the financial system. The reason for governments to step in was that the banking 
system itself, due to a lack of trust, was no longer functioning smoothly as liquidity in the 
interbank market dried up. This liquidity crunch threatened to spill over to the real economy 
via  credit  markets.  There  are  however  several  problems  with  governmental  intervention. 
Firstly, insurance by the government induces moral hazard and can potentially increase the 
risk-taking  behaviour  that  originally  gave  rise  to  the  financial  crisis.  Furthermore, 
nationalized banks tend to work less efficiently in their operations and credit distribution as 
private banks. Lastly, the money tied up in the banking system increases government debt 
either explicitly or in an implicit way preventing the government to spend this money on its 
public obligations. The need for state intervention proofs that banks have not been operating 
with an appropriate attitude towards risk. Especially, banks that were coined “too big to fail” 
stand to benefit from an implicit state guarantee without bearing the cost of it. Thanks to this 
implicit  guarantee,  lenders  grant  favourable  interest  rate  terms  to  them,  shareholders  are 
willing to pay higher prices for their equity and the probability of a bank run is reduced 
significantly. The reason for this special treatment by investors is that the liability insurance 
by the state induces a riskless bond to debt holders who would have asked for higher risk 
premiums in  this  market  situation and  reduces  insolvency  risk  for  shareholders.  Without 
funding  or  repayment  of  these  insurances  by  banks,  further  risk  taking  by  financial 
institutions  is  encouraged  and  a  repetition  of  the  financial  crisis  becomes  more  likely. 
Moreover, the state’s  own financial position  deteriorates by the amount taken to support 
financial institutions and it has to bear the costs with higher interest rates on its debt and a 
business climate of uncertainty that lowers investments. Thus, when the next financial crisis 
hits the economy, the state might not be able to cover the losses anymore. 
In  a  free  market  environment,  the  state  should  not  specify  the  amount  of  risk  financial 
institutions take, but financial institutions should pay for the state insurance according to their 
risk  exposure.  Therefore,  the  implicit  state  guarantees  for  banks  that  have  a  systemic 
relevance should be made explicit by imposing a risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium. 
The assumption with deposit insurance is that only insured deposits are covered by the state 
guarantee  and  shareholders  have  to  take  the  residual  loss.  Otherwise,  market  discipline 
suffers,  because  shareholders  have  the  power  to  decide  on  the  risk  taking  behaviour  of 
financial institutions. This approach will reduce moral hazard problems and will keep the risk 
for  depositors to  a  minimum.  The  setting  of  this  study  is  in  the  context  of  the  political 
promise of full deposit insurance in Germany from October 5
th, 2008 and evaluates the value 
of this guarantee between January 2008 and May 2010 in quarterly steps. The foundation for 
the option-based estimation of deposit insurance was set with Merton (1977) and Merton 
(1978). The analysis of this study closely follows the article of De Giuli, Maggi, & Paris 
(2009) who consider a mutual guarantee framework like it exists in Germany. Prior studies 
received biased estimates of deposit insurance, because they neglect the effect of a mutual 
guarantee framework which is built to keep the government position sufficiently small. This 
paper extends the data series of De Giuli, Maggi, & Paris (2009) to the financial crisis data of 
2008-2010 and adapts its features to the German system. Therefore, it covers not only a 
single point in time, like prior studies did, but shows the development of the guarantee value 
before and after the political promise and thereby allows to study the costs of this event. 
Since this study is set in a German context instead of the Italian one by De Giuli, Maggi, & 
Paris  (2009),  the  applicability  of  the model  to  a  larger  set  of  countries  is  demonstrated.  
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Furthermore,  it  explicitly  attaches  an  estimate  to  the  political  promises  of  the  German 
government to insure all private deposits and outlines the effect public finances. Relevant 
policy parameters and asset correlation are scrutinized in a sensitivity analysis with respect to 
the level of asset volatility and correlations in downturn markets during the financial crisis. 
Thus, the question this analysis is going to answer is what the costs of full deposit insurance 
by the German government are to the public.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the current literature 
and discusses the set up of the German deposit insurance system. Section 3 describes the data 
and  estimates  two  parameters  for  the  model.  Section  4  explains  the  model  for  deposit 
insurance valuation and section 5 presents the model results. Section 6 applies a sensitivity 
analysis to the model. The final section concludes, mentions limitations and suggests further 
research.  
2.  Literature Review 
The literature stream dealing with the valuation of loans and deposit insurance in an option-
based framework relies on the initial works of Merton (1977) and the follow-up study Merton 
(1978). Merton  (1977)  applies the option  formula  of  Black & Scholes  (1973) to deposit 
insurance  for  financial  institutions.  He  establishes  the  relationship  between  ordinary  put 
options to deposit insurance by determining the isomorphic relationship between the payoff-
structure of deposit insurance and a European put option. The author argues that the payoff of 
the loan guarantee is essentially the same as the payoff of a European put option with strike 
price equal to the nominal value of insured deposits and where the time to maturity equals the 
remaining time to the next audit date. Thus, deposit insurance is modelled as a put option on 
the market value of bank assets. Merton (1978) takes the idea to the next level by taking into 
consideration surveillance costs and models deposit insurance as an infinite-maturity put with 
random audit dates. The option pricing frameworks of Merton (1977) and Merton (1978) is 
however limited to banks where valuations of a bank’s market value of assets, and asset 
volatility are available. As this data cannot be observed in the market, it has to be estimated 
based on observable market variables. Ronn & Verma (1986) illustrate how bank’s market 
value and asset volatility can be estimated from the variance and market value of bank’s 
equity together with the balance sheet values of nominal debt in an option-based framework. 
In their analysis, they differentiate between insured and other deposits. De Giuli, Maggi, & 
Paris (2009) extend the contingent-claim framework of Merton (1977) by taking into account 
the effect of an existing mutual guarantee framework among banks that significantly lowers 
the value of deposit insurance by a third party guarantee. The authors differentiate the option 
positions from the point of view of an insured bank, the long position with respect to the 
consortium, the long position with respect to the government and the short position with 
respect to the consortium by applying Monte Carlo simulation to a multi-asset framework. 
They analyze the effect of changes in asset volatility, asset correlation, debt-to-assets ratio, 
capital requirements and policy variables. This paper extends the literature by examining the 
impact of full deposit insurance in Germany on public finance in a longitudinal study from 
2008 until 2010. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the only study examining 
German  deposit  insurance  that  takes  the  effect  of  the  mutual  guarantee  framework  into 
account. 
2.1.   Background Deposit Insurance System in Germany 
According to Garcia (1999) deposit insurance systems are in place because they “(1) protect 
small depositors; (2) elucidate the rules under which sound depository institutions operate 
and under which failed institutions will be closed or otherwise resolved; and, in doing so, (3)  
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help  to  stabilize  the  financial  system  by  establishing  an  incentive  structure  that  will 
encourage good banking practice”. The adequate premium financial institutions should pay 
for  this  deposit  insurance  differs  from  country  to  country  and  is  dependent  upon  the 
regulatory and institutional framework as well as the business environment in which financial 
institutions operate. Several authors have reviewed the most important structure and design 
features such as membership, administration, funding, coverage and pricing. Garcia (1999) 
examines actual practices around the world and compares it with a set of best practices 
adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Demirgüç-Kunt & Sobaci (2001), whose 
data is updated and extended by Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, & Laeven (2005), lists the 
features  of  deposit  insurance  systems  in  different  countries.  These  articles  describe  the 
German deposit insurance system amongst others in great detail. The German banking market 
is dominated by universal banks that combine investment banking and retail banking. Their 
legal form classifies them as either private commercial banks, cooperative banks or public-
sector banks. Following the union of savings banks and Landesbanks, the German market is 
led by private commercial banks, which account for close to 28.2% of balance sheet sum in 
the banking market in Germany (Association of German Banks, 2009). This paper focuses on 
the mutual guarantee system of private commercial banks in Germany as it includes all banks 
operating in Germany that are listed on stock exchanges. 
The first deposit insurance system of commercial banks was established in 1966 and revised 
in  1969  by  the  Association  of  German  Banks  (“Bundesverband  deutscher  Banken”) 
(Association of German Banks, 2010). The initial EU Directive on deposit insurance was 
transposed into German law in 1998 and was devised to harmonize deposit insurance within 
the European Union. Next to the voluntary deposit insurance scheme of commercial banks, 
the act made the membership in a statutory compensation scheme obligatory for all banks 
that want to operate in Germany. It established the statutory deposit guarantee scheme, the 
“Entschädigungseinrichtung deutscher Banken” (EdB). The EdB performs the tasks of the 
compensation scheme for the area of the private commercial banks and private building and 
loan associations. In the past, the EdB provided compensation up to a maximum of € 20,000 
per  depositor.  The  voluntary  Deposit  Protection  Fund  (“Einlagensicherungsfonds  des 
Bundesverbandes  deutscher  Banken”)  of  private  commercial  banks  then  only  covered 
deposits to the extent that the EdB does not already secure these, (Association of German 
Banks, 2009). The recent financial crisis has brought about further changes in June 2009 
when  the  EU  Directive  on  Deposit  insurance  was  extended  to  increase  the  minimum 
guarantee on deposits by the EdB to € 50,000 and remove the co-insurance obligation of 
depositors. The co-insurance obligation required depositors to cover the losses of bank failure 
with  10%  of  their  deposits  in  order  to  entice  depositors  to  make  choices  that  are  more 
cautious on where to deposit their funds. The next step is to increase the minimum guarantee 
to € 100,000 on 31
st December 2010, when also the period it takes to refund depositors in 
case of bank failure is shortened to a maximum of 30 days. The history of statutory deposit 
insurance in Germany is summarised in Table 1: 
Year  Coverage amount  Currency  Coinsurance 
1966  10,000/20,000  DM  10% 
1969  20,000  DM  10% 
1998  20,000  EUR  10% 
2009  50,000  EUR  0% 
2010  100,000  EUR  0% 
Table 1 - History of Deposit Insurance in Germany 
For savings banks, state banks, state building societies and credit unions, an exemption exists 
that allows them not to participate in the statutory compensation scheme as long as their  
 
4 
respective deposit insurance association secures their liquidity and solvency. The difference 
to commercial banks is that their association secures the continuity of the whole institution 
whereas for private banks, only deposits are insured directly and the banks themselves can 
become insolvent. Garcia (1999) describes Germany as a country with an explicit deposit 
insurance system that relies on formal regulation, which specifies the main components of the 
deposit insurance system. The deposit insurance system for private banks covers deposits of 
private  persons  and  small  enterprises  in  national  as  well  as  in  foreign  currency,  but  no 
interbank deposits. Interbank deposits are not covered, because it can be expected that banks 
have the necessary experience and sophisticated business models to monitor other banks. An 
extension of coverage to interbank deposits would thus reduce market discipline as it keeps 
banks from mutual supervision. Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, & Laeven (2005) stated that 
the Deposit Protection Fund of private banks insures deposits of clients up to 30 percent of 
the relevant liable capital of the respective institution per depositor as stated in their last 
financial statement. This insurance covers term and saving deposits and registered savings 
certificates for all non-banking institutions but no bearer instruments. Insured deposits are for 
that  matter  virtually  risk-free  for  almost  all  depositors  as  long  as  the  mutual  guarantee 
framework is fully funded by its members. To ensure proper financial support, the Deposit 
Protection Fund is funded by its members on a non-risk-adjusted basis with a yearly flat fee 
of 0.03% based on the value of insured deposits. The fee can be doubled in case of a crisis, 
but payment can also be discontinued if the administration of the Deposit insurance fund 
feels it is sufficiently covered.  For such a system  with pre-funding of deposit insurance, 
Demirgüç-Kunt  &  Kane  (2002)  point  out  the  importance  of  a  strong  institutional 
environment, because these funds could literally be looted in countries with weak institutions. 
The true value of pre-funding is however not known to the public and cannot reliably be 
estimated by external parties, because the decision to discontinue payment requirements is 
not disclosed to the public. Thus, the main insurance is covered by the ex-post funding of the 
private banks that are required to contribute to the fund and refund depositors in case of bank 
failure if the ex-ante funding is not sufficient to cover all deposits affected by bank failure. 
Up to the writing of this paper, the Deposit Protect Fund has, to the extent of legal protection, 
wholly compensated depositors for all banks that failed since its inception (Association of 
German Banks, 2010).  
On October 5
th, 2008, the German government has given a political guarantee, which was 
extended in July 2009, by  Chancellor Angela Merkel that no German saver would loose 
money if their bank failed. The guarantee however remains a political question because it was 
not specified how long this guarantee would remain in place and probably needs to be revised 
when the next government takes office. 
Such  an  extensive  guarantee  on  deposits  protects  depositors  and  stabilises  the  financial 
system, but brings about further problems as well. Garcia (1999) states that moral hazard can 
occur when the protection extended to depositors makes them less careful initially in the 
selection of their bank, and later deters them from moving their funds to a safer haven. In 
addition, shareholders and agents of the insured bank are no longer scrutinized by depositors 
and may therefore increase risk in their investments or decrease the amount of capital and 
liquid reserves, which might shelter them from adverse shocks. In addition, adverse selection 
becomes an issue when weaker banks opt in, knowing that they will not have to fund the 
system, while stronger institutions opt out, because they fear that they have to bear the burden 
if weaker institutions fail. The voluntary nature and the non-risk-adjusted premium of the 
Deposit Protection Fund encourage adverse selection. Once adverse selection has occurred, 
the financially strong banks will either leave the fund, or, if they are already outside of its 
protection, remain independent of the mutual guarantee system. This has a negative effect on  
 
5 
the remaining members, because they will have to pay higher premiums in case of bank 
failures. This vicious circle keeps on going until the system itself can no longer fund itself, 
collapses and may harm the banking system itself. Furthermore, agency problems may arise 
when the administration of the Deposit Protection Fund would either delay the resolution of 
an  insolvent  bank  in  order  to  safeguard  the  banking  industry  or  bow  down  to  political 
pressure when politicians force the administration to treat banks that support them personally 
with forbearance. Garcia (1999) coined the terms “regulatory capture” and “political capture” 
for these two types of agency problems in deposit insurance systems.  
In  order  to  resolve  these  problems  the next  section  is  going  to  discuss  a  model  for  the 
estimation  of  risk-adjusted  premiums  for  the  full  deposit  insurance  of  the  German 
government as well as for the funding of the mutual guarantee system. To simplify the model, 
the protection by the EdB and  the Deposit protection fund are considered as one mutual 
guarantee system and the amount already accumulated in the fund by pre-funding is ignored 
as its value is non-public and cannot reliably be estimated.  
3.  Data and settings 
The statistics department of the German Central Bank (Bundesbank) provides the balance 
sheet  data  of  private  commercial  German  banks.  The  data  has  been  downloaded  from 
Bloomberg and converted to Euro. The reason for this is that virtually all depositors as well 
as  the  German  government  have  a  Euro  investment  perspective  and  will  evaluate  banks 
accordingly. The data is based on quarterly balance sheet publications by each bank.  For 
missing  data,  linear  interpolation  was  used.  Statistical  breaks  have  been  eliminated.  The 
figures are adjusted for removals or additions, mergers or liquidations of individual banks as 
well as reporting mistakes for which correction have been published later on. Banks that have 
been taken over by the German State are taken into consideration up to the point of their 
nationalization. Within the mutual guarantee framework of private commercial banks, there 
are  26  banks  that  are  listed  on  a  stock  exchange  and  for  which  suitable  market  data is 




Names  Symbol 
German Treasury Rate  ݎ 
Market value of equity  ܧ௜ሺݐሻ 
Book value of equity   ܤܸܧ௜ሺݐሻ 
Book value of covered deposits  ܦ௜ሺݐሻ 
Book value of other liabilities  ܲ௜ሺݐሻ 
Daily stock price  ܵ௜ሺݐሻ 
Table 2 - Bloomberg retrieved data 
The effect of the economic and financial crisis on German 1-year treasury rates is shown in 
Figure 1. The yield on the 1-year German treasury rate decreased from close to 4% to below 




Figure 1 - German 1-year treasury rate 
The development of bank’s book values for customer deposits, other liabilities and equity are 
shown in Figure 2. The values are averaged among the sample banks and normalized to focus 
on the development. The figure demonstrates that book values of liabilities and equity did not 
change  much  during  the  financial  crisis.  The  only  visible  trend  is  that  banks  tended  to 
increase their equity capital, either by capital infusions or retained earnings, while at the same 
time decreasing other liabilities in recent times. The trend towards deleveraging points to a 
more conservative investment policy of banks at the end of the financial crisis. 
 
Figure 2 - Development of Book Values 
Market values however tell a less stable story. As Figure 3 illustrates, the market value of 
equity  was  fluctuating  significantly.  It  decreased  until  spring  2009  and  then  started  to 
recover. Equity volatility showed the opposite picture. The observation that equity volatility 
increases in downturn markets can be seen frequently in financial markets. Relatively low 
equity valuations and high equity volatility at the same time are a signal by the market that an 
investment is risky ceteris paribus. This signal thus serves as a first indication that the cost of 











































































































































































Figure 3 - Market Value of Equity and Volatility 
Following prior studies (Merton, 1977; Ronn & Verma, 1986; Kendall & Levonian, 1991; 
Allen & Saunders, 1993; Laeven, 2002) the time horizon ܶ is set to 1 year. The German 
government  did  not  provide  an  estimate  on  when  the  political  promise  would  fade  out, 
therefore  a  yearly  audit  period  for  banks  appears  reasonable  and  it  provides  the 
methodological advantage that annual deposit insurance premiums can directly be estimated. 
Deposits  are  assumed  to  grow  at  the  respective  German  Treasury  rate,  because  the 
government ultimately insures them. For simplicity, it is assumed that other bank liabilities 
evolve at the German treasury rate as well. The rescue packages designed for German banks 
significantly  lowered  the  risk  of  banks  with  lower  ratings  and  enabled  them  to  borrow 
cheaper money than their rating would otherwise have demanded. The German Treasury rate 
until maturity is known at ݐ ൌ ͲǤ With respect to asset correlation,ߩ௜௝, the analysis of the 
German mutual guarantee system faces the same lack of reliable bank asset correlation data 
as did De Giuli, Maggi, & Paris (2009). Therefore, an initial correlation coefficient of 0.7 is 
assumed, but the effect of changes in asset correlation will be illustrated in  a sensitivity 
analysis. The data for the two types of liabilities and the asset value are averaged among the 
26 banks, for which the complete data was available, and normalised to EUR 1 of assets to 
represent the average capital structure of the complete set of 174-182 German banks in the 
deposit insurance system within the financial crisis. The instantaneous standard deviation of 
equity, ߪாǡ is estimated annually from daily equity returns on the assumption that historical 
price volatility will prevail in the near future as well. 
3.1. Estimating asset market value and volatility 
In order to estimate the asset-weighted average volatility and the market value of assets for 
the sample, the Ronn & Verma  (1986) model is applied to each bank separately in each 
quarter. Schellhorn & Spellman (1996) summarise the relevant assumptions for this model. 
The authors state that the capital structure consists of equity, insured and other liabilities. All 
liabilities have the same term to maturity which coincides with the banks next audit date. 
There are no auditing costs. Banks roll over their liabilities every quarter to keep the maturity 
constant. The model specifies that at the next audit date the value of equity be given by  
ܧ ൌ ݉ܽݔሼͲǡܸ െ ሺܦ ൅ ܲሻሽ 
Where ܸ represents the market value of assets. Based on the assumptions in the Black & 
















































































































































Market Value Equity (left axis) Equity Volatility  (right axis) 
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  ܧ ൌ ܸܰሺݔሻ െ ሺܦ ൅ ܲሻܰ൫ݔ െ ߪ௏ξܶ൯ 
where  
ݔ ؠ










  [2] 
The  instantaneous  standard  deviation  of  the  market  value  of  assets  is  denoted  by  ߪ௏. 
Equations [1] and [2] assume that all debt is valued at the risk-free interest rate. As stated 
above and noted by Ronn & Verma (1986) this assumption is going to understate the value of 
the deposit insurance premium. However, the effect is going to be negligible, because option 
values  are  not  very  sensitive  to  small  changes  in  the  interest  rate.  Furthermore,  the 
assumption only affects other liabilities because deposits can be regarded as risk-free due to 
deposit insurance.  
The financial crisis has shown that governments intervened in several bank closures where 
they  either  injected  capital,  guaranteed  loans  or  did  not  immediately  declare  a  bank  as 
insolvent even if the value of bank assets did not sufficiently cover its obligations. The latter 
method is nonetheless only tolerated as long as a certain threshold in value is not undercut. 
Below this threshold, liquidation would become prohibitively expensive and the government 
has to resort to bank closure. Ronn & Verma (1986) defines this threshold as a percentage of 
banks total debt,ߩܤ, where ߩ ൑ ͳ. No forbearance ሺߩ ൌ ͳሻ occurs when at  maturity, the 
value of assets is less than total liabilities and the bank is immediately declared insolvent. 
Alternatively, the deposit insurer may temporarily allow the bank to operate with insufficient 
assets to cover liabilities. A ߩ value less than one effectively lowers the closure threshold and 
represents a policy of forbearance. Ultimately ߩ is a forward looking policy parameter that is 
difficult to estimate in the environment of a financial crisis. With this modified closure rule 
equations [1] and [2] become 
  ܧ ൌ ܸܰሺݔሻ െ ߩሺܦ ൅ ܲሻܰ൫ݔ െ ߪ௏ξܶ൯ 
where  
ݔ ؠ










  [4] 
This paper adopts a value of ߩ ൌ ͲǤͻ͹ (Ronn & Verma, 1986; De Giuli, Maggi, & Paris, 
2009) for the analysis. The sensitivity analysis in section 6 outlines the effect of other values 
for ߩ. To estimate the market value of assets, ܸ, and its asset volatility, ߪ௏, equations [3] and 
[4] are solved simultaneously for the two unknowns. The starting values, ܸ and ߪ௏, in the 
MATLAB
® solver function are set to the sum of market value of equity and face value of 
debt  and  the  volatility  of  equity  scaled  down  by  the  leverage  ratio  respectively.  The 
application of the Ronn & Verma (1986) model to this dataset shows that in the period of the 
highest asset volatility, the market value of assets were most depressed. This increases the 
likelihood of insolvency and thus a possible claim on the deposit insurance. The next section  
 
9 
is going to outline the model to estimate the value of this deposit insurance on a risk-adjusted 
basis. 
 
Figure 4 - Market Value of Assets and Volatility 
4.  Model specification 
Following closely the model developed by  De Giuli, Maggi, & Paris(2009) the reference 
framework for this analysis is the German mutual guarantee system of private commercial 
banks.  The  Deposit  Protection  Fund  covers  any  shortfall  if  one  of  their  members  goes 
bankrupt, up to the total solvency of its members. Due to the political promise of full deposit 
insurance, the government covers any residual losses. In order to find an estimate for the 
value  of  deposit  insurance  a  contingent  claim  approach  is  applied,  (Laeven,  2002).  The 
isomorphic relationship between options and the value of deposit insurance is applied to three 
European options written on bank assets. The basic model of  De  Giuli, Maggi, & Paris 
(2009) considers a one-period ሺݐ߳ሼͲǡܶሽሻ arbitrage free model with ݊ banks where all banks 
pay off their debts at ܶ with the value of their assets. Table 3 clarifies the notation used in the 
models for each bank ݅ሺݓ݅ݐ݄݅ ൌ ͳǡڮǡ݊ሻ: 
Names  Symbol 
Number of banks in the consortium  ݊ 
Time horizon  ܶ 
Risk-free rate (German 1-year Treasury rate)  ݎ 
Market Value of Assets  ܣ௜ሺݐሻ 
Covered Deposits  ܦ௜ሺݐሻ 
Other liabilities  ܲ௜ሺݐሻ 
Instantaneous standard deviation asset   ߪ௏௜ 
Asset correlation coefficient  ߩ௜௝ 
Cumulative normal density function  ܰሺȉሻ 























Market Value Assets (left axis) Asset Volatility (right axis) 
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The  net  value  of  each  bank  can  then  be  calculated  as ܰ௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ܣ௜ሺݐሻ െ ሾܲ௜ሺݐሻ ൅ ܦ௜ሺݐሻሿ. 
Preferred debts are not taken into consideration due to the lack of reliable data. The mutual 




ǡ ݂݅݅ א ܵǡ
Ͳǡ ݂݅݅ ב ܵǡ
 
ܵ being the set of solvent banks. The asset backed deposits ratio ܮ௜ሺݐሻdefined as  
 








  [5] 
determines the amount by which each bank can pay for  its debt and can be employed to 
measure the amount of insolvency on each banks deposits as ܦ௜ሺܶሻሾͳ െ ܮ௜ሺܶሻሿ. The amount 
of aggregate insolvency in the mutual guarantee system is then measured as   




The remaining solvent banks have to fund the consortium. Thus, the consortium itself is 





  [6] 
Whenever ܪሺܶሻ exceeds ܯ the government has to cover the residual loss. In contrast to De 
Giuli, Maggi, & Paris (2009), who analyse the Italian mutual guarantee system, the German 
system does not have a global coverage amount ܭ of the consortium. Instead, the German 
system insures up to 30 percent of the relevant liable capital of the respective institution per 
depositor  as  stated  in  their  last  financial  statement.  Garcia  (1999)  defined  this  as 
“comprehensive coverage” and the Association of German Banks (2010) stated that almost 
no depositor exceeds this limit, because large clients tend to diversify their funds. Equations 
[5] and  [6]  both  show that the amount of insolvency as  well as the effective maximum 
coverage of the consortium depends on the dynamics of bank assets.  
De Giuli, Maggi, & Paris (2009) apply an option-pricing framework in this setup, to measure 
the economic value of the following three option positions:  
1. A long position with respect to the consortium regarding coverage of deposits 
 
݌ଵ௜ ൌ ൜
݉݅݊ሺ݉ǡͳሻܦ௜ሺܶሻሾͳ െ ܮ௜ሺܶሻሿାǡ݂݅ܪሺܶሻ ് Ͳ
Ͳǡ݂݅ܪሺܶሻ ൌ Ͳ
  [7] 
݉ ൌ
ெ
ுሺ்ሻ being the share of aggregate insolvency covered by M 
2. A long position with respect to the government regarding coverage of any losses exceeding 
those funded by the consortium 
 
݌ଶ௜ ൌ ൜
ሾͳ െ ݉݅݊ሺ݉ǡͳሻሿܦ௜ሺܶሻሾͳ െ ܮ௜ሺܶሻሿାǡ݂݅ܪሺܶሻ ് Ͳ
Ͳǡ݂݅ܪሺܶሻ ൌ Ͳ
  [8]  
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3. A short position with respect to the consortium regarding consortium funding 
  ݌ଷ௜ ൌ െ݉݅݊ሺߙ௜ܯǡߙ௜ܪሺܶሻǡሾܰ௜ሺܶሻሿାሻ  [9] 
When  a  certain  bank  is  not  able  to  cover  its  contribution  to  the  consortium  ሺെ݌ଷ௜ ൐
ሾܰ௜ሺܶሻሿାሻ, the missing contributions are refunded by an increase of contributions by the 
remaining banks according to their net asset value until ݉݅݊൫ܯǡܪሺܶሻ൯ ൅ σ ݌ଷ௝
௡
௝ୀଵ ൌ Ͳ. The 
proper funding of the mutual guarantee framework together with the promise of full deposit 
insurance by the government ensures that depositors can regard their deposits as risk-free. 
The mutual guarantee framework as presented by De Giuli, Maggi, & Paris (2009) considers 
not only a single bank’s assets, but also the interaction between all members of the interbank 
fund.  Thus,  the  analysis  is  based  on  a multi-asset  contingent  claim analysis.  Due  to the 





















െ ݎݒ௞௜ ൌ Ͳ 
݇ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ 
with Equations [7], [8] and [9] as boundary conditions, cannot be explicitly computed. These 
position  values  are computed  by  Monte  Carlo  simulation,  generating  10,000  runs  of  the 




5.  Deposit Guarantee evaluation 
The period covered by the data series includes two dates that stand out in this analysis. The 
data point closest to the announcement of full deposit insurance on October 5
th, 2008 (base 
case)  and  the  data  point  corresponding  to  the  maximum  deposit  insurance  value  for  the 
government (max case) on September 30
th, 2009. The inputs for the valuation are given in 
Table  4.  The  data  show  that  the  capital  structure  remained  relatively  stable.  There  are 
however  significant  changes  in  the  size  of  the  consortium,  the  risk-free  rate  and  asset 
volatility. A smaller consortium reduces the coverage of the consortium, because potential 
losses have to be covered by fewer banks and therefore leaves a larger residual to be covered 
by the government. The lower risk-free rate drives up the put premium for the government, 
because the value of liabilities is less discounted which is why their present value is higher. 
Higher asset volatility reflects greater fluctuations in the market value of assets and thus can 
lead more banks to insolvency, reducing their contributions to the consortium and calling for 
funding by the government. This two-sided effect of a volatility increase lets the government 
premium rise.  




Number of banks in the consortium  ݊  ͳͺʹ  ͳ͹Ͷ  
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Time horizon  ܶ  ͳ  ͳ 
Risk-free rate (German 1-year Treasury rate)  ݎ  ͵ǤͲͶͶͷΨ  ͲǤ͸ͺʹͲΨ 
Market Value of Assets (normalised)  ܣ௜ሺͲሻ  ͳ׊݅  ͳ׊݅ 
Covered Deposits  ܦ௜ሺͲሻ  ͲǤͶ͵ͺͳ׊݅  ͲǤͶͷͲͷ׊݅ 
Other liabilities  ܲ௜ሺͲሻ  ͲǤͷͲͶʹ׊݅  ͲǤͷͲͳͻ׊݅ 
Instantaneous standard deviation asset   ߪ௏௜  ͵ǤͲͻͻΨ׊݅  ͹ǤͻͷͺΨ׊݅ 
Asset correlation coefficient  ߩ௜௝  ͲǤ͹ǡ݅ ് ݆  ͲǤ͹ǡ݅ ് ݆ 
Table 4 - Parameter values base case & max case 
The development of the average value of deposit insurance premium per Euro over time is 
shown  in  Figure  5.  The  figure  shows  that  within  the  financial  crisis  the cost of  deposit 
insurance for the government has risen from almost zero to a maximum of 0.3715% for every 
insured Euro. ݒ1௜ and ݒ3௜  mirror each other, because everything that can be paid out by the 
consortium first has to be  funded by solvent member banks. The figure reveals that the 
largest  part  of  implicit  costs  to  the  government  by  deposit  insurance  occurred  after  the 
political promise was given.  
 
Figure 5 - Average Deposit Insurance Premium per Euro 
The Deutsche Bundesbank (2010) in their statistics section provides aggregate information 
about  all  private  commercial  banks,  almost  all  of  which  are  members  of  the  Deposit 
Protection Fund.  Moreover, there are four  banks that are, due to their size and business 
volume, classified as “big banks” by the Association of German Banks (2010). In 2004, these 
four made up for a total market share of 18%, measured in terms of assets, of the whole 
German banking market, (Association of German Banks, 2010). Unfortunately, the Italian 
UniCredit  Bank  does  not  publish  separate  book  values  for  its  German  operation  of 
HypoVereinsbank. The remaining banks are Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Postbank. 


























Max  Base  
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German Government for each of these banks as well the costs for all banks in the consortium 
in quarterly steps. Thus, Table 5 illustrates part of the results from Figure 5 in absolute terms. 
Date  Average Deposit 
Premium per Euro 
Deutsche 
Bank  Commerzbank  Postbank  Whole 
Consortium 
31-12-2007  0.000457%  2.09  0.73  0.51  5.15 
31-03-2008  0.001659%  7.29  2.67  1.87  19.41 
30-06-2008  0.003451%  14.58  5.69  3.90  40.26 
30-09-2008  0.016386%  70.15  28.24  18.96  194.08 
31-12-2008  0.111839%  442.38  190.35  131.38  1397.02 
31-03-2009  0.249060%  985.46  772.66  309.41  3163.98 
30-06-2009  0.342749%  1263.14  1016.66  445.02  4401.07 
30-09-2009  0.371456%  1355.72  1025.09  496.48  4715.17 
31-12-2009  0.089462%  307.95  236.73  118.08  1115.74 
31-03-2010  0.012458%  45.60  32.44  16.72  154.48 
Table 5 – Government deposit insurance premium in million Euro 
Table 5 shows that at the start of the political promise on October 5
th, 2008, the costs to the 
government were relatively moderate. Nevertheless, the German state missed the opportunity 
to specify a final maturity of its political promise. The failure to do so renewed this guarantee 
from quarter to quarter for the public and let its implicit value rise within one year from €194 
million to €4715 million. Due to the mutual guarantee framework, the German government 
did not have to bear the complete burden of full deposit insurance. All solvent member banks 
have the obligation to contribute to the consortium, which is resembled by their short position 
towards the consortium. The costs of this implicit commitment to the member banks are 
shown in Table 6. The table outlines that a mutual guarantee system significantly lowers the 
cost  of  full  deposit  insurance  for  the  government.  From  the  total  insurance  value,  the 





Date  Average Deposit 
Premium per Euro 
Whole Consortium 
in mio Euro 
31-12-2007  0.00289%  32.61 
31-03-2008  0.00887%  103.81 
30-06-2008  0.01433%  167.21 
30-09-2008  0.03451%  408.75 
31-12-2008  0.10542%  1316.83 
31-03-2009  0.16767%  2130.06 
30-06-2009  0.22669%  2910.80 
30-09-2009  0.24466%  3105.60 
31-12-2009  0.10031%  1251.08 
31-03-2010  0.02902%  359.84 
Table 6 - Consortium deposit insurance premium in million Euro 
Figure 6 demonstrates the development of position values of the three option positions on 
each  measurement  day  based  on  bank  assets  for  bank ݅’s  assets.  The  figure  graphically 
illustrates that ݒଵ௜ and ݒଶ௜ indeed represent long puts, whereas ݒଷ௜ shows the shape of a short  
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call, all of which with strike price equal to each banks total liabilities. The figure shows 
clearly that at the beginning of the financial crisis, the mutual guarantee framework was well 
able to deal with insolvent banks by itself. The contributions for each member bank were low 
even if their asset values would have allowed for higher contributions. As the financial crisis 
progressed, firstly the contributions of banks with higher asset values, ݒଷ௜, increased (became 
more  negative),  because  there  were  more  banks  that  were  at  the  margin  of  becoming 
insolvent, and could thus not fund the consortium. The financially stronger banks therefore 
had to take on higher contributions than before. In the next step, after those banks were no 
longer able to bear this risk to an adequate degree, the government had to step in and take the 




Figure 6 - Position values with respect to normalised asset values over time  
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To be able to derive appropriate policy recommendations from this analysis, it needs to be 
determined to what extent the value of deposit insurance reacts to changes in the model 
inputs. 
6.  Sensitivity analysis 
The model employed in this study depends largely on the proper estimation of its inputs. 
Figure 7 is based on the data of the max case and shows that the cost of deposit insurance for 
the government as well as for the consortium increases with the volatility of bank assets and 
shows that riskier banks benefit more from this guarantee. Therefore, an incentive exists for 
banks to exploit the guarantee, because in case of bankruptcy, their deposits are secured by 
the government and the consortium, but they do not have to pay the costs by funding the 
consortium. 
  
Figure 7 – Position values per insured Euro with respect to bank asset volatility 
Figure 8 is also based on the data of the max case and illustrates that a lower bank asset 
correlation can even in the most unfavourable market environment decrease the burden of full 
deposit insurance to the government. At the point where banks are fully uncorrelated the cost 
to  the  government  are  virtually  zero,  because  the  consortium  will  have  enough  solvent 
members to cover the deposits at bankrupt banks. Therefore, it is desirable to establish rules 
that ensure a diversified banking system and highlights the importance of proper parameter 
estimation for the pricing of deposit insurance. 
































Figure 8 - Average government value per insured Euro and correlation 
The amount of forbearance granted to banks by the government has an immediate effect on 
the value of deposit insurance that has to be covered by the government, which is shown in 
Figure 9. If the deposit insurer temporarily allows banks to operate with insufficient assets to 
cover  liabilities  (ߩ ൏ 1ሻ,  the  value  of  deposit insurance,  provided  by  the  government to 
banks, increases accordingly. Therefore,  the government needs to be aware that granting 
forbearance to banks will not only put debt holders of banks at risk, but will increase its own 
implicit guarantee obligation as well.  
 
Figure 9 - Average Deposit Insurance Premium per Euro for the Government at different levels of ࣋ 
In crisis times, correlations as well as volatility of bank assets tend to increase, thereby also 
increasing the value of the government commitment to full deposit insurance. Therefore, it is 
important to devise regulations that ensure the burden to the government is kept as minimal 
as possible especially in crisis times. Furthermore, the direct effect of forbearance on the 
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deposit insurance government position should incentivise the government to declare banks 
insolvent close to the point when assets do no longer cover liabilities. 
7.  Conclusion 
The analysis has shown that the German government supported private commercial banks 
organized in the Deposit Protection Fund by an estimated amount of up to EUR 4.7 billion 
per 1-year  period  by its promise of full deposit protection. Due to the mutual guarantee 
system, an additional amount of EUR 3.1 billion was already covered by the member banks 
of the Deposit protection fund. The government missed the opportunity to limit their promise 
to a pre-defined time period. A 1-year guarantee on the date of the first promise would only 
have implied a cost of EUR 194 million. That is why, the German government should devise 
and  communicate  a  clear  set  of  rules  for  full  deposit  insurance  before  the  next  crisis, 
including specific timelines for its support. Moreover, the government failed to make banks 
participate at the costs of this guarantee in a risk-adjusted way. One suggestion of this study 
would therefore be to modify the existing mutual guarantee framework, by adding a rescue 
fund that charges premiums, which accumulate from year to year until the next crisis draws 
on its funds. Banks should have no right to discontinue payments if they feel the rescue fund 
is  sufficiently  funded,  because  within  a  financial  crisis  they  would  have  difficulties  to 
generate the capital necessary to cover the losses of others. In addition, the amount of the 
premium  charged  for  this  rescue  fund  should  be  based  on  the  riskiness  of  each  bank 
separately as discussed in this study. This would reduce the incentives for banks to increase 
risk, as discussed in the sensitivity analysis, thereby reducing moral hazard.  
The model presented in this paper is essentially suited for this task as it addresses one of the 
main practical problems in determining risk-adjusted premiums for banks, the assignment of 
premiums based on observable and objective criteria. The inclusion in this mutual guarantee 
framework should be mandatory for all banks that want to operate in Germany in order to 
prevent  adverse  selection.  In  order  to  reduce  contagion  effects  of  banks,  the 
interconnectedness between banks and asset correlations should be as low as possible. The 
sensitivity analysis has shown that there is no need for the government to step in and stabilize 
the system in times of crisis when the correlation among bank assets is sufficiently small. To 
this extent, it is useful to dismiss the model of large universal banks, which essentially all 
follow the same business model and are too correlated and “too-big-to-fail” in times of crisis, 
in  favour  of  a  system  with  smaller  more  specialized  banks.  This  could  be  achieved  for 
example  by  a  tax  on  bank  metrics  such  as  the  balance  sheet  sum.  Furthermore,  the 
government should only grant limited forbearance to banks, because it results in unwanted 
incentives for banks and it increases the premium of deposit insurance for the government 
position. 
The limitations of this study are foremost based on the proper estimation of the parameter 
inputs to the model. Firstly, historical volatility can only be a proxy for the true  forward-
looking  volatility  of  bank  assets  used  in  this  model.  Secondly,  forward  looking  asset 
correlation  can  best  be  estimated  by  regulators  that  get  access  to  banks  books.  Thirdly, 
regulators need to specify explicitly their tolerated level of forbearance as input to the Ronn 
& Verma (1986) model. Further research, should deal with the proper estimation of these 
parameters as well as different regulatory provisions that could be used to deal with the goals 
of risk-adjusted premiums and a more diversified banking system. In addition, an application 
to different time frames might shed more light on the risk-taking incentives of banks outside 
of a financial crisis. The model can then be used to define a new set of rules for the German  
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deposit insurance system to improve its stability and help to prevent the adverse effects of the 
next financial crisis.  References 
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